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ABSTRACT 
The aim of the paper is to present a review of the fiscal imbalances and 
debt crisis in Greece and identify the possible links with the recent 
developments in the Greek property market. We follow a non-technical 
approach to discuss a number of factors that have contributed to the 
fiscal crisis that Greece has been experiencing since October 2009. We 
critically analyse both the “internal” causes of the deteriorating fiscal 
stance of the Greek economy (that is, the prolonged macroeconomic 
imbalances that the Greek economy faces and the credibility problem of 
macroeconomic policy) and the “external” factors that might have 
contributed to the Greek fiscal crisis (that is implications of the recent 
financial turmoil and the timing of the response of Europe to the Greek 
fiscal crisis). We then study the extent to which fiscal imbalances and the 
debt crisis have affected the Greek property sector.  
One of the distinctive features of the paper is to critically discuss the 
direct and indirect effects of the prolonged macroeconomic imbalances 
on the Greek property sector. Our analysis indicates that the current 
fiscal stance of the Greek economy and the Greek property market crisis 
are intertwined. We believe that these results are useful and provide 
some evidence that current economic recession has a considerable 
adverse effect on the property sector in Greece. 
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Greek Fiscal Crisis and Repercussions  
for the Property Market 
 
1. Introduction 
The financial crisis that unfolded in mid-2008 led to a dramatic increase 
of public debt in many advanced economies. During the recent years, we 
have seen the transformation of the 2007 US subprime mortgage loan 
market crisis into a sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone (Reinhart and 
Rogoff, 2009 and 2010). Greece and other periphery EMU countries 
(Ireland, Portugal and Cyprus) are severely hit by the sovereign debt 
“storm” (De Grauwe, 2010).  
In late 2009 and early 2010, the ability of the Greek government to run 
large budget deficits for a very long period of time and to roll-over its 
debt has been questioned due to the perceived by the international 
capital markets high probability of sovereign default. The end result was 
an escalating cost of borrowing, which forced the Greek government to 
design and adopt a fiscal consolidation programme in order to reduce 
public debt and provide the framework to improve stability and growth 
of the economy (Kouretas and Vlamis, 2010). 
The current Greek tragedy appears to have at least three key players. 
First, beyond any doubt the main responsibility for the debt crisis in 
Greece rests with the Greek governments and the existence of a weak 
political system that led to a constant mismanagement of the domestic 
economy adding government debt at a rate, which was much higher 
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than the rest of the Eurozone at a time that the level of the public debt 
has already been more than 100% of GDP.  
Second, the financial markets and in particular the credit rating agencies 
have been very myopic in predicting the 2007 US sub-prime mortgage 
loan crisis. This failure led the credit rating agencies to an overreaction in 
their attempt to unveil potential sovereign debt crises. Greece and other 
periphery EMU countries were the natural targets since they had for a 
long period of time very large budget deficits. They kept downgrading 
Greece’s sovereign debt rating due to the perceived by the international 
capital markets high probability of Greece’s default and eventually, 
Greece was forced to withdraw from the international bond markets.  
Third, a fair part of blame for the current situation is linked with the 
delayed reaction of the Eurozone governments as well as the European 
Central Bank (ECB hereafter). The Eurozone countries and in particular 
Germany failed to give a clear signal to the markets that they were 
willing to provide immediate political and financial support to whichever 
country was facing financial problems. One reason for this slow reaction 
is linked to the issue of whether a bailout of a country-member was 
allowed according to the EU Treaties. A stronger reason is the lack of 
political union in Europe, which has not as yet, in the fear of moral 
hazard issues, allowed the formation of a federal fiscal budget with a 
common fiscal policy within EU and an adjustment mechanism in place 
to deal with crisis at a supranational level. More recently, though, an 
attempt was made to set up rescue mechanisms of such kind (the 
European Financial Stability Facility and the European Stability 
Mechanism). 
  3 
Also, the ECB did not have a clear strategy to fight the imminent debt 
crisis in early 2010; it did not provide a clear signal to the markets that it 
would keep accepting government bonds as collateral in liquidity 
provision even in the case that the credit ratings of the bonds have been 
downgraded below the A- threshold rating (Kouretas and Vlamis, 2010). 
It was only when it was made clear that the markets will keep 
speculating on the Greek bonds that the, at the time, President of the 
ECB, Jean-Claude Trichet announced that ECB will continue to accept 
Greek government debt as collateral, independently of the ratings 
assigned by the rating agencies. 
As far as the Greek property market is concerned, this has always been 
one of the pillars of economic growth in Greece. The construction 
industry in particular was considered to be one of the most important 
sectors of the Greek economy (before the fiscal crisis) and this was not 
only because of its size (Kalfamanoli and Vlamis, 2010). It significantly 
affected the country’s economic growth and because of that, its 
importance for the growth prospects of the Greek economy has never 
been questioned. More specifically, its contribution to the GDP since the 
year 2000 ranges between 6% and 8% (in both current and constant 
prices), while it employs more than 7% of the total country’s labour 
force. Also, the construction sector affects heavily, although indirectly, 
other sectors of the Greek economy such as mining, building material, 
electrical equipment, etc. (Benos, Karagiannis and Vlamis, 2011).  
The implementation of strict austerity programmes, from 2010 onwards, 
has caused substantial decrease in demand for goods and services 
pushing the Greek economy to a deep recession. Since there is a 
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feedback effect from the macroeconomy to the property sector 
(Karousos and Vlamis, 2008) individual sectors such as construction, real 
estate services etc. are expected to be negatively affected. In fact, quite 
a few companies that were considered as big players in the Greek real 
estate industry and used to be listed in the Athens Stock Exchange 
during the period 2000-2007, are now bankrupt.  
The aim of this paper is first, to review and critically discuss the sources 
of fiscal imbalances and debt crisis in Greece. Second, although 
repercussions of the crisis cannot be entirely estimated since it is not 
over yet, we intend to provide a general overview of the recent 
developments in the real estate market in light of the current economic 
crisis. We do not try to prove here that there is a causal relationship -in 
econometrics terms- between macroeconomy and the property sector. 
We would rather like to present and analyse the likely negative effects 
that have been directed from the macroeconomy to the real estate 
market. To the best of the author’s knowledge, none of the existing 
studies in this area provides systematic treatment of the Greek fiscal 
crisis as a contributory factor in explaining the current crisis in the Greek 
property market.  
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents a review of fiscal 
imbalances and the debt crisis in Greece. In Section 3, we present 
descriptive data regarding the recession in the Greek commercial real 
estate market. We also review the outcome of a survey conducted by 
the National Federation of the Greek Retailers showing the percentage 
of the retail shops that have ceased operation in the Attika region of 
Greece since August 2010 and we try to link these results with the likely 
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causes of the Greek property market crisis.  Section 4 concludes the 
paper. 
2. The main causes of the current Greek fiscal crisis 
There is no doubt that running consistently widening public deficits in 
combination with declining external competitiveness played a decisive 
role on the deteriorating fiscal stance of the Greek economyIncreased 
public expenditure during the last decade, when Greece was 
experiencing high growth rates, has led to dramatic increase in 
borrowing requirements and high levels of accumulated public debt1. 
The lack of the necessary fiscal consolidation and the continuous false 
reporting of fiscal data have undermined the Greece’s government 
credibility. In mid-October 2009, the newly elected government 
announced the budget deficit for 2009 was estimated to be 12.7% of 
GDP while the previous government was arguing in September 2009 that 
deficit would not be higher than 6.5% of GDP. The EU statistics agency, 
Eurostat, had retrospectively revised upward the Greek budget deficit 
for 2009 and this has been raised to 15.6% of GDP. 
Moreover, the decline in competitiveness since EMU entry led to a 
persistent deficit in the current account (Malliaropoulos, 2010). 
Increased “twin deficits” together with the lack of structural reforms in 
home regarding labour market flexibility, social security and market 
competition, forced Greece to issue new bonds at short maturity periods 
and at higher interest rates compared to the “anchor” of the EMU, that 
is Germany. As a result, the ability of the Greek government to roll-over 
                                                 
1 The level of Central Government Debt as of 31.12.2009 amounted to €298.5 billion. 
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its debt has been brutally questioned due to the perceived by the 
international capital markets high probability of sovereign default.  
Other factors that contributed to the fiscal crisis, which Greece has been 
experiencing since October 2009, are exogenous and have to do with the 
implications of the recent financial turmoil and the timing of the 
response of Europe to the Greek fiscal crisis. More specifically, the 
Eurozone governments failed to give a clear signal indicating their 
readiness to support Greece, while the Greek fiscal crisis was escalating. 
Legal scepticism and questions like “are bailouts illegal?” were raised, 
mostly by Germany, for an issue which was partly political. However, 
there is nothing in the Maastricht Treaty that prevents EU Member 
States from providing Community financial assistance to a country in 
financial difficulty, with or without the support of an outside body. More 
specifically, Article 103a (section 2) of the Maastricht Treaty states that 
“where a Member State is in difficulties or is seriously threatened with 
severe difficulties caused by exceptional occurrences beyond its control, 
the Council may, acting unanimously on a proposal from the 
Commission, grant, under certain conditions, Community financial 
assistance to the Member State concerned” (Treaty on European Union, 
1992).  
While Eurozone policy makers were debating whether bailouts are 
illegal, at the same time there were some ambiguities about ECB’s 
application of the minimum credit rating threshold in the collateral 
eligibility requirements for the purposes of the Eurosystem’s credit 
operations in the case of marketable debt instruments issued or 
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guaranteed by the Greek government. These ambiguities created 
problems for financial institutions holding Greek government bonds. 
Another exogenous factor that contributed to the instability of the Greek 
economy was the, at the time, lack of solidarity funds at an EU level. This 
lack of European solidarity was gradually mirrored in widening Greek 
spreads to German Bund. In the spring-summer of 2008, the spread of 
the 10-year Greek government bond yield against the German Bund 
ranged between 25 and 65 basis points. Then, following the general 
elections in October 2009, a dramatic increase of the spread was 
recorded when it was obvious that public debt was reaching an 
unsustainable level. Figure 1 shows how the 10-year Greek government 
bond yield against the German Bund fluctuated from early November 
2009, just after the newly elected Social-democratic government came 
to power, until April 2010, when Eurozone members agreed to provide, 
if needed, financial assistance to Greece. 
FIGURE 1: Greek 10-year bond yield spread to the German 
Bund - November 2009 - April 2010 
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On 11 February 2010, at an informal Summit, European leaders agreed 
to take coordinated action to ensure financial stability within the 
Eurozone, however, they did not produce a bailout plan for Greece. On 
25 March 2010, the EU leaders agreed to provide bilateral loans pooled 
by the European Commission (the so-called "Greek Loan Facility") for a 
total amount of €110 billion (consisting of €80 billion provided by the 
euro-area Member States and €30 billion from the IMF) 3-year rescue 
package for Greece. The First Economic Adjustment Programme for 
Greece was adopted by the Eurogroup on 02 May 2010. The next day, 
the Governing Council of the ECB has decided to “suspend the 
application of the minimum credit rating threshold in the collateral 
eligibility requirements for the purposes of the Eurosystem’s credit 
operations in the case of marketable debt instruments issued or 
guaranteed by the Greek government” (ECB, 2010) and that it will 
continue accepting the Greek government bonds until further notice 
(ECB, 2012a and 2012b).  
On 9 May 2010, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) was 
created by the Euro area Member States following the decisions taken 
within the framework of the Ecofin Council. It became fully operational 
in August 20102. The EFSF’s mandate is “to safeguard financial stability in 
Europe by providing financial assistance to euro area Member States 
within the framework of a macro-economic adjustment programme” 
(EFSF, 2013).  
                                                 
2 Later on, in October 2012, it was decided by the Euro area Member States to create a 
rather permanent rescue mechanism, the so called European Stability Mechanism, which 
entered into force on 8 October 2012. 
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On 27 October 2011, European leaders agreed on a 53 percent haircut of 
the Greek debt owed to private sector bondholders. The so called PSI+ 
(private sector involvement plus) was successfully completed in March 
2012. On 14 March 2012, the Euro area finance ministers approved 
financing of a Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece; the 
Euro area Member States and the IMF committed the undisbursed 
amounts of the “Greek Loan Facility” (that is the first economic 
adjustment programme) plus an additional €130 billion for the years 
2012-14. Whereas the financing of the first programme was based on 
bilateral loans, it was agreed that - on the side of euro area Member 
States - the second programme would be financed by the EFSF 
(European Commission, 2013a).  
As a result of all these developments, the total Central Government Debt 
outstanding as of 31.03.2013 was equal to €309.3 billion (Ministry of 
Finance, 2013a) and the debt-to-GDP ratio has been dramatically 
increased. More specifically, according to the Eurostat’s Government 
finance statistics, the debt-to-GDP ratio (Table 1) has increased from 
129.7% in 2009 to 148.3% in 2010 and 170.3% in 2011, while it dropped 
to 156.9% of GDP in 2012 (Eurostat, 2013). European Commission 
(2013b) argues that the debt-to-GDP ratio forecast will resume a 
declining path in 2014 and under the assumption that the Second 
Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece will be fully implemented, 
it is expected that Greece's general government debt would become 
lower than 120% of GDP by 2021. 
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TABLE 1: Eurostat’s government finance statistics: Budget Deficit-to-
GDP and Debt-to-GDP for EU-27  
 
 
Poul Thomsen, the IMF’s mission chief for Greece, has recently 
commented that “while Greece’s debt level is projected to remain high 
into the medium term, it will be on a clear downward path, and Greece’s 
European partners have also promised to provide any additional debt 
relief required to keep it on this path, provided of course that Greece 
implements the program as promised. In concrete terms, they have 
committed to take any necessary measures to reduce the country’s debt 
to 124 percent of GDP in 2020 and substantially below 110 percent in 
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2022, provided Greece meets its fiscal targets” 3. Moreover, he added 
that “Greece has made very substantial progress in reducing its fiscal 
imbalances. It has undertaken a fiscal effort of close to 15 percent of 
GDP in underlying adjustment. This is large by any international 
comparison. And this year, Greece is on track to reach primary balance, 
so that spending—before you include interest payments—is equal to 
revenues. So, Greece has come to a much better situation on the fiscal 
side” (IMF, 2013a).  
Final 2012 data confirmed that the primary fiscal deficit last year was 
narrower than the original programme target, at 6.3% of GDP (net of the 
4% of GDP effect of bank recapitalizations), compared to the projected 
7.3% in March 2012. Admittedly, the better-than-expected performance 
mainly stemmed from lower interest spending (down from €15bn, or 
7.2% of GDP in 2011, to €9.7bn or 5.0% of GDP in 2012) following the 
successful completion of the March PSI+ and the December debt 
buyback. The primary deficit, at 1.3% of GDP, stood broadly in line with 
the official forecast of 1.5% of GDP.  
Data for the first four months of 2013 suggest this trend has continued 
(Ministry of Finance, 2013b). The central government budget deficit 
stood at €2.4bn fiscal year-to-date (April 2013), against a €7.2bn deficit 
in the same period of 2012. Moreover, revenues seem to be stabilizing, 
although at very low levels, in the past couple of months relative to a 
clear declining trend in the second half of 2012. The General Accounting 
                                                 
3 Paul Thomsen’s comment was made on the IMF Survey Magazine (June 5, 2013) on the 
occasion of the publication of the Fund’s annual health check of the Greek economy. This 
publication was approved by the IMF’s Executive Board on May 31, 2013, together with the 
third review of the IMF’s €28 billion loan under the Extended Fund Facility. 
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Office of the Greek Ministry of Finance noted in the April budget press 
statement that revenues in the recent months had beaten the official 
targets for the first time. The development of the State Budget, until 
April 2013, makes apparent the intensification of fiscal adjustment 
efforts towards the target of a primary surplus of 4.5 percent of GDP or 
approximately €9.5 billion4.  
Thus, it seems that public finances of the Greek economy gradually 
stabilise. However, major weaknesses and problems still impact the 
Greek government budget, including an inadequate tax collection 
mechanism and widespread tax evasion, the high unemployment rate, 
which is at record levels of 26% in 2012Q4 (Hellenic Statistical Authority, 
2013a) and the economic recession for the year 2013, which is 
forecasted to reach 4.09% y-o-y (KEPE, 2013). Lastly, there is a growing 
discussion and concerns about:  i) the likely shortfall in revenues in the 
years to come, ii) the determination of the fiscal gap for the period 
2015-2016, which is currently estimated by the European Commission 
(2013c) to be at around 1¾% of GDP in 2015 and 2% of GDP in 2016 and 
by the IMF (2013b) to be at around €4.4 billion in 2015 and €6.5 billion 
in 2016, and iii) the necessary measures needed in order to cover that 
gap.  
Gerry Rice, the Director of the Communications Department of the IMF, 
has recently commented that “…A gap is projected for after July 2014 
but I think at this stage we want to take it one step at a time. We need 
to discuss the budget, we need to look at what exactly the financing 
needs would be, and what the financing gap would be in that context -- 
                                                 
4 This target must be achieved by 2016. 
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also, to remind that the European partners have made commitments to 
provide adequate future financing for Greece, provided that the 
program is implemented” (IMF, 2013c). 
3. The evolution of the Greek real estate market in light of the 
fiscal crisis 
Published data by the Hellenic Statistical Authority (2013b) reveals that 
the Greek economy is in deep recession with the growth rate of GDP 
being -5.6% (measured in fixed prices, base year 2005) in 2013Q1 (in 
comparison to 2012Q1). This recession is reinforced by the existing 
negative psychology because the market participants are afraid of the 
not-yet-seen repercussions of the Greek debt crisis. Moreover, frequent 
changes to tax laws create uncertainty and reduce business confidence 
(Kalfamanoli and Vlamis, 2008). This is expected to affect negatively 
property transactions and, consequently, the companies engaged in the 
Greek construction sector, real estate services etc. Also, the so called 
“objective values”5 of real assets for both urban and rural areas are to be 
reviewed upwards -sometime between now and 2016- since they are 
unchanged since the year 2007. This might have a further negative effect 
on property transactions. Data that have recently been published by the 
Bank of Greece (2013a) shows that the volume of real estate sales 
continues to fall, from 74,586 in 2009 to 74,457 in 2010, 42,814 in 2011 
and 29,584 in 2012 (Table 2).  
                                                 
5 The “objective value” of the real estate assets is, in fact, the “taxable value” of transactions 
in the Greek real estate market. Sometimes the “objective value” of a property is lower than 
its actual market value. To adjust for the difference between the objective value and the 
market value of a property, the former are frequently reviewed (particularly when Greek 
governments are short of tax revenues). “Objective values” for the different types of real 
estate assets are exogenously set by the Greek government and their estimation are 
theoretically based on prevailing market conditions (demand and supply). 
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TABLE 2: Volume of property transactions in Greece for 2009-2012 (in 
thousands) 
  2009 2010 2011 2012 
Volume of estimated property 
transactions (with financial institutions 
intermediation) 
74,586 74,457 42,814 29,584 
(%) percentage change  -35.7% -0.2% - 42.5% -30,9% 
Source: Bank of Greece (2013a). 
 
The q-o-q picture for the volume of the property sales for 2012 and 2013 
shows that they continue to fall, from 6,861 in 2012Q2 to 5,623 in 
2012Q3 and 4,976 in 2013Q1 (Table 3).  
TABLE 3: Volume of property transactions in Greece for 2012-2013 q-o-
q (in thousands) 
  2012Q1 2012Q2 2012Q3 2012Q4 2013Q1 
Volume of estimated property 
transactions (with financial 
institutions intermediation) 
6,594 6,861 5,623 10,506 4,976 
(%) percentage change  -48.5% -43.0% -42.1% 27.3% -24.5% 
Source: Bank of Greece (2013a). 
 
The crisis that the Greek property market is experiencing has also been 
crucially linked to the Greek banking crisis and the consequent credit 
crunch that has emerged; commercial banks are facing liquidity 
constraints and thus, since December 2010, they keep reducing the 
available funds to the domestic private sector (Bank of Greece, 2013b) 
(Table 4).  
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TABLE 4: Bank credit to the domestic private sector (percentage 
change)   
Months Year 2013 Year 2012 Year 2011 Year 2010 
January -3,2 -3,1 -0,7 3,6 
February -3,3 -3,2 -1.1 3,6 
March -3,2 -3,4 -1,3 3,5 
April -3,2 -3,4 -1,5 3,3 
May -3,1 -3,5 -1,7 3,0 
June  -3,5 -1,7 2,3 
July  -3,5 -2,1 1,9 
August  -3,6 -2,1 1,6 
September  -3,7 -2,1 1,0 
October  -3,7 -2,4 0,7 
November  -3,5 -2,7 0,3 
December  -3,4 -2,9 -0,4 
Source: Bank of Greece (2013b). 
 
According to the most recent available data from the Hellenic Statistical 
Authority (2013c), the volume of the private and public building activity 
across the country (measured by the number of building permits) has 
decreased by 46% during the period April 2012 - March 2013 (in 
comparison to the period April 2011 - March 2012). Additionally, 
recently published data by the Hellenic Statistical Authority (2013d) 
reveals that the production index in construction has fallen by 19% in 
2012Q4 (in comparison to 2011Q4)6.  
                                                 
6 Most of the Greek construction companies rushed to build new houses before the 
introduction of VAT on new residential buildings (effective from 01-01-2006). When they 
completed the construction of the houses in 2006-2007, demand for new houses had 
already started decelerating; people were more interested in buying second-hand houses 
(between 2-10 years old) rather than buying the more expensive brand new ones. The Greek 
construction companies are now unwilling to start selling in lower prices the stock of newly 
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As far as the commercial real estate sub-markets are concerned (Office 
market/industrial/logistics), they present the following features: a) 
tendency for renegotiation of the terms of the lease contracts, which 
very often leads to considerably lower rents for the lessee, b) reduced 
demand for new office, retail or industrial space because of the 
macroeconomic instability, which raises households’ concern about 
future incomes and employment and c) higher yields for potential 
investors. Real estate market practitioners argue that this picture is 
expected to remain fairly similar for the year 2013 (Colliers International, 
2012). 
The implementation of strict austerity programmes since the year 2010 
has been causing considerable decrease in demand for goods and 
services and the austerity programmes have pushed the Greek retail real 
estate sector into deep recession. Because of that, small and medium-
sized retailers have been driven to bankruptcy. Thus, the current fiscal 
crisis has direct adverse effects on firm closure.  
The National Federation of the Greek Retailers has conducted a survey 
regarding the retail shops that have ceased operation in the Attika 
region of Greece between August 2010 and March 2012. Results are 
presented in Table 5.  
                                                                                                                                            
built houses that they own because if they do so, they will realize huge losses. As a result, 
there is excess supply of newly built houses on-sale around Greece, which is estimated to be 
around 150,000-200,000. 
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TABLE 5: Percentage change of retail shops that closed down in the 
Attika Region of Greece between August 2010 and August 2012  
Areas August 2010 March 2011 August 2011 March 2012 
City Centre-Athens 18 23.4 24.4 29.6 
Marousi  16.3 17 19.5 17 
Kifissia  11.8 21 23.8 23.7 
Chalandri  17 22.3 20.5 20 
Kolonaki  12.5 18.6 23.7 19.7 
Ν. Ιonia 14.7 17.8 21.2 28.1 
Kalithea  13.5 16.8 19.6 22.7 
Piraeus  11 17.6 22 27.3 
Source: Data available from the National Federation of Greek Retailers (March, 
2012). 
 
In the eight major areas of the Attika region of Greece (City Centre-
Athens, Marousi, Kifissia, Chalandri, Kolonaki, Ν. Ιonia, Kalithea and 
Piraeus) there is an increasing tendency for closing down of retail shops, 
with percentages ranging between 11% in Piraeus to 29.6% in the City 
Centre of Athens. The severe increase in the percentage of retail shops 
that closed down in the City Centre of Athens between August 2010 and 
March 2012 can be attributed to a number of factors: 1) economic 
recession has hit the larger regions of Greece more severely (Hellenic 
Statistical Authority, 2010), 2) the increase in all different types of crime 
in the City Centre of Athens (Hellenic Police, 2012), and 3) the violent 
riots, against the introduction and implementation of harsh austerity 
measures, are usually taking place in the City Centre of Athens (National 
Federation of Greek Retailers, 2012).  
As it is correctly pointed out in the Annual Report (p. 61) of the Governor 
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of the Bank of Greece for the Year 2011 (April 2012), the possibility of 
the Greek property market going out of the recession is crucially linked 
to market participants’ expectations, improvement of the lending terms 
of companies and the recovery of the economy at large (Bank of Greece, 
2012). It is very likely that it will take quite some time for the Greek 
property market to recover. This is the case because the factors that 
contributed to the exemplary growth performance of the Greek 
property sector, particularly after the year 2000, have now ceased to 
exist (Karousos and Vlamis, 2008).  
Of primary importance was the contribution of the EU 2nd and 3rd 
Community Support Framework (CSF), which provided ample funding for 
public infrastructure. At the national level, all Greek regions enjoyed 
support from these programmes in terms of infrastructure investments, 
such as new roads and motorways, the railway network, airports, tourist 
sites, etc. (Benos, Karagiannis and Vlamis, 2011). The amount of money 
that Greece is expected to receive from the Fourth Community Support 
Framework for the period 2007-2013 is about €20 billion. Greece’s share 
from the EU support framework is less than the money that Greece had 
previously secured with the three previous Community Support 
Programmes. A bigger share is now diverted to the new members of the 
EU which have substantially lower GDP compared to EU average 
(Karousos and Vlamis, 2008).  
Second, during the 1990s and at the beginning of the new century, 
significant structural changes took place in Greece, which have had a 
certain effect on the Greek property sector. Starting from the 
international economic environment, the European Monetary Union was 
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underway through the implementation of stabilizing macroeconomic 
rules and policies that led to low cost of financing. Thus, a decline in 
interest rates made mortgage loans accessible and boosted demand for 
privately-owned housing. It is now expected that US and EU monetary 
authorities will increase interest rates in the medium to longer-term in 
order to deal with the likely inflationary pressures (ECB, 2011). 
Consequently, demand for new mortgage loans and household demand 
for newly built houses are expected to fall.  
Third, the organisation of the Athens 2004 Olympic Games significantly 
boosted investment activity in Greece; construction of sports sites and 
development of public infrastructure projects. Fourth, the inclusion of 
new land in the National City Plan expanded the available space for new 
constructions mainly in the Capital city of Greece (Karousos and Vlamis, 
2008).  
4. Concluding comments 
A number of factors have contributed to the fiscal crisis that Greece has 
been experiencing since October 2009. Some of these factors are 
endogenous; have to do with the structure of the Greek economy itself, 
the prolonged macroeconomic imbalances that the Greek economy 
faces and the credibility problem of macroeconomic policy. Other factors 
are exogenous and have to do with the implications of the recent 
financial turmoil, the functioning of the Eurozone itself and the timing of 
the response of Europe to the Greek fiscal crisis.  
We briefly reviewed, in this paper, first the internal causes of the 
deteriorating fiscal stance of the Greek economy and then we discussed 
  20 
the external factors that might have contributed to the Greek fiscal 
crisis. Whereas, in the short run, the attempt to ease the debt crisis 
came in the form of two rescue packages financed directly by EU and 
IMF (the first and the second bailout programme for Greece) and 
indirectly by the private sector bondholders, the solution to the Greek 
problem, in the long run, would be to redesign its economic and fiscal 
policies. 
We also provided a general overview of the recent developments in the 
real estate market in light of the current economic crisis and tried to 
highlight and unveil the extent to which the current fiscal stance of the 
Greek economy and the Greek property market crisis are intertwined. It 
seems that fiscal imbalances of the Greek economy have negatively 
affected the Greek property sector; the implementation of strict 
austerity programmes designed by the Greek government, in order to 
reduce the budget deficit and stabilize public debt, caused a substantial 
decrease in demand for goods and services pushing the Greek economy 
and consequently the property market in deep recession.  
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